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INTRODUCTION
Dams are built for varying purposes. Dams may be built to generate hydro-electric power, or to store and divert water for irrigation,
water supply, or flood control. Construction of dams for any of these
purposes usually alters or diverts river flow and could adversely affect existing water rights of riparian states. Such adverse effects can
be quantitative, qualitative, or both, and can extend to downstream as
* Lead Counsel, Legal Department, The World Bank. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the World Bank. The
author would like to thank Professor Charles Bourne for assistance with some aspects of this article.
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well as to upstream riparian states. Thus, dams have become a major
source of tension between riparian states. Such tension has escalated
in some parts of the world into disputes over the rights and obligations of the riparian states over the shared rivers.
It should be emphasized at the outset that not every river in the
world has been affected by construction of a dam; only about fifty
percent of the world rivers have dams built on them.' It is also worth
noting that not every river affected by a dam is an international river.
Many of the international discussions on the issue of dams place special emphasis on the environmental and social effects of dams. However, there has been limited discussion on the rights and obligations
of the riparian states, which share the international river where the
dam is built. Indeed, in 1996 the Operations Evaluation Department
of the World Bank issued a report (the "OED Report") that reviewed
fifty large dams in some thirty countries, but the OED Report primarily focused on development objectives and the social and environmental impacts of each of the dam projects. The OED Report
"finds that the projects have a mixed record in their treatment of displaced people and their effects on the environment. '2 Although a
number of those dams were built on international rivers, there was no
discussion of riparian rights and obligations in the OED Report.
Following publication of the OED Report in August 1996, the
World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the World Bank organized a
workshop in Gland, Switzerland, in April 1997 ("Gland Workshop").
The objectives of the Gland Workshop were: (i) to review the Report
and compare the results to documented experiences from other
countries; (ii) to develop a methodological framework for a phase II
study, which would consider the critical issues that need to be ad1. See WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A N[EW
FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (The Report of the World Commission on
Dams)' at xxx (Earthscan 2000) [hereinafter WCD REPORT], see also World
Commission on Dams, Dams & Development (June 6, 2001) available at
http://www.dams.org/ (explaining the purpose and objectives of the organization).
2. See OED Precis Number 125, World Bank Lending for Large Dams: A
Preliminary Review of Impacts, September 1996 (summarizing an internal Bank
Report prepared by OED entitled The World Bank's Experience with Large Dams
- A Preliminaly Review of Impacts, Profile of Large Dams (Background Documents, August 15, 1996).
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dressed in determining the future development of a large dam, (iii) to
propose a rigorous and transparent process for defining the scope,
objectives, organization, and financing of the follow up work, including the Phase II study; and (iv) to identify follow-up actions necessary for the development of generally accepted standards for assessment, planning, building, operating, and financing of large dams
that would adequately reflect lessons learnt from past experience.'
The four overview papers presented and discussed at the Gland
Workshop dealt with engineering and economic aspects, social impacts, environmental impacts, and future challenges facing the hydropower industry.4 Like the OED Report, the issues of dams built
on international rivers and the riparian states' rights and duties
thereon, were not among the issues addressed during the Gland
Workshop. The major outcome of the Gland Workshop was an
agreement to establish a two-year World Commission on Dams (the
"Commission") by November 1997 The objectives of the Commission, as they were developed and refined, were: (i) to review the development effectiveness of large dams" and assess alternatives for

3. See Large Danis: Learning From the Past, Looking at the tFuture, (Tony

Dorsey, ed.), Workshop Proceedings, Gland, Switzerland. at 5-6. July 1997 [hereinafter Gland Workshop Proceedings] (noting that the thirty-nine participants that
were invited to the Gland Workshop included "'seven from the World Bank. six
from Government agencies, seven from local NGOs (two of \%hom were unable to
come in the last minute), five from IUCN. eight from private dam construction and
consulting companies and industry organizations, and four from academia/research.); see id. at 7 (explaining that 37 participants actually attended the
Gland Workshop).
4. See Gland Workshop Proceedings. supra note 3. at 6-7.
5. See id. at 9 (pointing out that the Commission %%as formally announced in
Washington DC in February 1998, and began its work in May 1998), see also
World Commission on Dams, Interim Report, 1. 4 (July 1999) (noting the Interim
Report indicated there were 13 members of the Commission, whereas, the Report
of the World Commission on Dams indicates there are 12 members of the Commission); id. at 4 (explaining that Ms. Shen Guoyi (People's Republic of China)
was no longer included in the list of the Commissioners in the WCD REPORT).
6. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1. at Il(explaining that the International
Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines a large dam as (0 a dam with a
height of fifteen meters or more from the foundation, and (ii) a dam with a height
of five to fifteen meters and has a reservoir volume of more than three million cubic meters). Based on this definition, the Commission concluded that there are currently more than 45,000 large dams around the world. See td.
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water resources and energy development, and (ii) to develop internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines, and standards where appropriate, for the planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation,
monitoring, and decommissioning of dams.7
Unlike the OED Report or the Gland Workshop, the work of the
Commission was extensive and elaborate, and addressed technical,
economic, financial, and environmental aspects, as well as the rights
and obligations of riparian states over the shared rivers where the
dams are built.8 Indeed, the Commission covered the issue of international rivers by including as one of its seven strategic priorities
"sharing rivers for peace, development and security."9 The Commission also established a number of policy principles and recommendations regarding the building of dams on shared rivers.t' The pur7. See WCD REPORT, supra note I, at 28 (stating that the objectives are more
focused than the terms of reference originally agreed to at the Gland Workshop,
which were (i) to assess the experience with existing, new and proposed large dam
projects so as to improve current practices and social and environmental conditions; (ii) to develop decision-making criteria, and policy and regulatory frameworks for assessing alternatives for energy and water resources development; (iii)
to evaluate the development effectiveness of large dams; (iv) to develop and promote internationally acceptable standards for the planning, assessment, design,
construction, operation and monitoring of large dam projects and, if the dams are
built, ensure affected peoples are better off; (v) to identify the implications for institutional, policy and financial arrangements so that benefits, costs and risks are
equitably shared at the global, national and local levels; and (vi) to recommend interim modifications - where necessary - of existing policies and guidelines, and
promote "best practices"); see also Gland Workshop Proceedings, supra note 3, at
9-10 (providing the original terms of reference for the Commission). Although the
Gland terms of reference may seem broader than the two objectives of the Commission specified in the text above, the main elements from the Gland terms of reference are covered in the Commission's objectives. Indeed, the Commission
broadened the Gland terms of reference by including items like decommissioning
dams.
8. See WCD REPORT, supra note I, at 2.
9. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1,ch. 8 (discussing the strategic priorities);
see also infra, Part II.
10. See Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Aug. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 317 (2001) [hereinafter
SADC Protocol on Shared Watercources] (using the term "shared rivers"); see also
WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 257 (noting that the Commission used the term
"shared rivers," and, less often, the term "transboundary rivers," instead of the
widely used term "international rivers."). This article uses these three terms synonymously.
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pose of this article is to review and analyze how the Commission addressed the issue of shared rivers, and compare the policy principles
and recommendations with the principles of contemporary international water law as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
(the "UN Convention").'

I. THE COMMISSION'S METHODOLOGY AND
KNOWLEDGE BASE
Before delving into the principles and recommendations enunciated by the Commission with regard to shared rivers, it may be usefui to discuss briefly the methodology followed by the Commission
and the knowledge base for its findings and recommendations as far
as they relate to the discussion of shared rivers. The Commission indicated at the outset that improving development outcomes requires
an expanded basis for decision-making that reflects full knowledge
of benefits, impacts, and risks with regard to water and energy. 12
Such an expanded basis for decision-making also requires "introducing new voices, perspectives and criteria into decision-making, as
well as processes that will build consensus around the decisions
reached."1 3 The Commission identified five core values which illustrate its understanding of those issues: equity, efficiency, participatory decision-making, sustainability, and accountability.' 4 These core
values are a fundamental part of the Report. Furthermore, the Commission linked those values to "a globally accepted framework for
setting universal goals, norms and standards."-' The Commission
identified the United Nations Charter (1945) and the Universal Dec11. See UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, opened for signature May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997)
[hereinafter UN Convention].
12. See WCD REPORT supra note 1, ch. 6 (discussing the decision- making
structure used by the Commission).
13.
for the
14.
15.

See id. at xxxii (noting what will be done to increase the information basis
decision-making process).
See id. at 23 (setting forth the values of the Commission).
See id. at xxxiii.
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laration of Human Rights (1948) as the foundation for the framework. The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development
(1986) and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
(1992) also provide support for the framework utilized by the Commission. The "core values" and the aforementioned international
agreements are complementary because they "cover a broad spectrum [of issues] ranging from human rights, through social develop6
ment and environment, to economic cooperation."'1
Indeed, the discussion by the Commission on the issue of shared
rivers centers around the need for cooperation between riparian
states 7 in sharing the waters and other benefits derived therefrom.
The Commission's Report elaborates on this concept by saying:
As specific interventions for diverting water, dams require constructive
co-operation. Consequently, the use and management of resources increasingly becomes the subject of agreement between States to promote
mutual self-interest for regional co-operation and peaceful collaboration.
This leads to a shift in focus from the narrow approach of allocating a finite resource to the sharing of rivers and their associated benefits in which
states are innovative in defining the scope of issues for discussion.18

The Commission based its Report on a large variety of sources.
These sources included eight in-depth case studies of large dams,
16. See id. at 200-02 (highlighting the elements of each of the instruments); Id.
at 284-85 (discussing the precautionary approach). The WCD Report attributed the
date 1947 to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but this is clearly a typographical error since the Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on December 10, 1948. See generally, DAVID CUSHMAN COYLtF,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND How IT WORKS 63 (1963).
17. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 257 (defining the term riparian state "to
mean any State through which a transboundary river flows or forms part of its
boundary, or which includes part of the catchment area of a transboundary river").
This is a wider definition than the generally agreed upon definition as it renders a
state riparian because it includes part of the catchment area. See UN Convention,
supra note 11, art. 2(a) (defining the term "watercourse" to mean "a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a
unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus); see also UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(b) (defining the term "international watercourse" as
"a watercourse where parts of which are situated in different states").
18. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at xxxv.
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country studies for large dams in India and China, a briefing paper
on dams in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, a
cross-check survey for 125 existing dams in 52 countries, seventeen
thematic review papers, four regional consultations," and more than
900 submissions from interested individuals, groups, and institutions. 20 Five of the eight case studies pertained to international rivers.21 Those rivers are the Columbia River for the Grand Coulee
Dam, the Zambezi River for the Kariba Dam, the Orange River for
the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams, the Indus River for the Tarbela
Dam, and the Mekong River for the Pak Mun Dam.' One of the seventeen thematic reviews dealt with "River basins - institutional
frameworks and management options," and included ten papers covering a wide range of topics. 23
The five international rivers included as part of the eight case
studies are quite varied with regard to the number of riparian countries, the presence of some form of cooperative arrangements over
the basin, and whether such arrangements have been concluded by
all or some of the riparian countries. 2 As will be discussed later, the
Commission's Report, unfortunately, did not address those issues as
comprehensively as it did with the environmental, social, economic,
and financial issues. Indeed, the recommendations of the Commission are based solely on its findings in the environmental, social, and
financial areas. The recommendations of the Commission regarding
shared rivers are not linked to its findings in this area because no
findings regarding shared rivers are discussed.
19. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at xxv (outlining the four regional consultations that took place in Colombo, Sri Lanka for South Asia; Hanoi, Vietnam
for East and South-East Asia; Sao Paulo, Brazil for the Americas; and Cairo, Egypt
for Africa and the Middle East).
20.

See id. at xxx.

21.

Seeid. at 30-31.

22. See id. (discussing the case studies that dealt with dams built. The dams
built on national rivers are the Tocantins River in Brazil for the Rucurui Dam, the
Ceyhan River in Turkey for the Aslantas Dam, and the Glomma and Laagen Basin
for some 40 dams in Norway).
23.

See id. at 366 (listing papers for this thematic re\sew).

24.

See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
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II. THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Part two of the Commission's Report is entitled "The Way Forward. '25 Chapter 8 lays down seven strategic priorities for guiding
decision-making with regard to dams. Those strategic priorities are:
(i) gaining public acceptance; (ii) comprehensive options assessment;
(iii) addressing existing dams; (iv) sustaining rivers and livelihoods;
(v) recognizing entitlements and sharing benefits; (vi) ensuring compliance; and (vii) sharing rivers for peace, development, and security. 26 Each priority includes a set of recommended principles, which
in the Commission's view "if applied, will lead to more equitable
and sustainable outcomes in the future. 27
The Commission's discussion of the strategic priority for shared
rivers started by noting the presence of "261 watersheds that cross
the political boundaries of two or more countries. These basins cover
about 45% of the earth's land surface, account for about 80% of
' 28
global river flow and affect about 40% of the world's population.
The Commission further noted that most of those basins do not have
agreements governing allocation of their waters, 29 and underscored
25. See id. at 288.
26. See id. ch.8 (laying out the strategic priorities of the Commission in making
future recommendations).
27. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 195 (including 26 recommendations
under the seven strategic priorities); id. at 278 (indicating Commission's intent that
the recommendations become guidelines for implementing "good practice[s]"); 0.
ch. 9 (discussing the guidelines in detail).
28. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16. (indicating that the term "rivers"
is used as a general term, and that "the strategic priority and policy principles relate equally to all types of waters which are or might be impacted by dams."); see
also WILLIAM COSGROVE & FRANK RUSBERMAN, WORLD WATER VISION,
MAKING WATER EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS, 43 (2000) (explaining that the World

Water Council, estimates the number of international river basins as "close to
300"). Authors in this field have used different methodologies for identifying international rivers, which has resulted in varying numbers. See PETER GLEICK, THE
WORLD'S WATER 2000-200 1, THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES
219 (2000).
29. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 174 (noting that "since 805 AD approximately 3,600 water related treaties were signed between nations"). A majority
of the treaties relate to navigation and national boundaries, while close to 300 are
non-navigational and cover issues related to water quantity, water quality and hydropower. See id. Many of these treaties are narrow in scope and do not extend
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the absence of an overarching globally binding instrument on international rivers, since the UN Convention has not yet entered into
force and effect."0 The Commission recommended the following five
principles with regard to the strategic priority for shared rivers:
A. BASIN AGREEMENTS ON SHARED RIVERS

The Commission's first policy principle recommended that national water policies and legislation should make specific provision
for basin agreements on shared river basins." The rationale behind
this recommendation is to provide a clear statement of the riparian
states' intention to cooperate over shared rivers, and to set out the
basic principles to be embodied in future agreements. South Africa
adopted this approach in their National Water Act by including references to such international agreements.3 2 Such provisions, the Coinprinciples for integrated resource management throughout the basin. See id.
30. See G.A. Res. 2669, U.N. GAOR 25th Sess. (1970) (asking the International Law Commission (ILC) to study the topic of international watercourses).
The ILC started work on the draft Convention at its twenty-third session in 197 1,
completed its work, adopted the articles of the draft Convention and recommended
the draft articles to the General Assembly on June 24, 1994. See 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, Part two, 88 (1997). The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on May 21, 1997 by a vote of 103-3 (Burundi, China and Turkey voted
against the Convention) with 27 abstentions. See UN Convention, supra note 11.
When the WCD Report was issued on November 16, 2000, sixteen countries had
signed the Convention, and eight countries had ratified it. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 35 (explaining that thirty-five instruments of ratification are necessary for the Convention to enter into force and effect).
31. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 251-56.
32. See §2 of Republic of South Africa National Water Act, Act 36 of 1998
(specifying the purpose of the Act is "'to ensure that the nation's water resources
are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in ways which
take into account amongst other factors (a) ....
(b) ....(i) meeting international
obligations."); id. ch. 10 (authorizing the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry
"to establish bodies to implement international agreements," which address management and development of shared water resources, and provide for increased regional cooperation). The concept of the "'Reserve" is a domestic, legislative
mechanism "to give effect to South Africa's international obligations for the protection and preservation of the ecosystems of international watercourses and for
the sustainable development and equitable utilization of those watercourses."). See
Robyn Stein, South Africa's New Democratic Water Legislation: National Government's Role as Public Trustee in Dam Building and Management Activities, 18
J.ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 284 (2000).
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mission believes, would also provide the basis for more integrated
management agreements for the shared rivers. Those agreements
would, in turn, prompt the riparian states to "adopt a progressive approach to institutional development, starting with exchange of information, joint scientific teams to analyse data, and joint arrangements
for monitoring the implementation of agreements."33
The Commission continued its discussion of the UN Convention
under the first principle, and went on to recommend that "States
should make every effort to ratify the Convention and bring it into
force."34 If there are obstacles to endorsing the UN Convention, the
Commission recommends that some key elements of the Convention
could still be used for further dialogue between the riparian states.
Those elements are the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the need to notify other riparian states of planned measures that may have significant effect on them.35
Despite its overall fair comprehension of the principles of international water law, the Commission, unfortunately, seems to have accepted the misconception that there is a conflict between the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization on the one hand, and the
obligation to not cause significant harm on the other.3 In this regard,
the Commission, referring to those two principles, stated:
The meaning of these terms is still evolving. Particularly, the application of the principle of 'no significant harm' will often conflict at a basin
33. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 253.
34. See id. (mentioning that the Commission referred more than eight times in
its Report to the UN Convention). This clearly underscores the importance the
Commission has attached to the UN Convention.
35. See id. at 253.
36. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 366 (noting only one of the 17 thematic
reviews, which formed the basis for the Report's strategic priorities on shared rivers, addressed "River Basins - Institutional frameworks and management options"). Unfortunately, none of the authors of those papers is an international water
lawyer, and this must have contributed to some of the misconceptions about international water law. One must, however, hasten to add that the Chairman of the
Commission, Professor Kader Asmal, is a prominent lawyer in a number of fields
including human rights and water law. The emphasis given to human rights and
water law in the WCD Report is, no doubt, attributable to his chairmanship of the
Commission.
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level with many applications of the principle of *equitable and reasonable
utilization.' These interactions have not fully been resolved legally or
customarily, suggesting that in their application, these principles should
be read alongside the Commission's strategic priorities when planning
future water resources and hydro-power developments)

A careful reading of the UN Convention should, however, reveal
that there is actually no conflict between the principle of "equitable
and reasonable utilization," and the "obligation [to] not cause significant harm." Article 6 of the UN Convention enumerates a number of
factors for determining what is equitable and reasonable utilization.
Those factors include, "the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other watercourse States" and
"existing and potential uses of the watercourse." 3' At the same time,
those factors will have to be used, together with any others, to determine if any significant harm is caused to another riparian state.
Moreover, Article 7(1) of the UN Convention obliges watercourse
states, when utilizing an international watercourse in their territory,
to take all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other
watercourse states.3 9 When significant harm nevertheless is caused to
another watercourse state, then Article 7(2) of the UN Convention
obliges the state causing the harm to "take all appropriate measures,
having due regard to Articles 5 and 6,in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.""' Articles 5 and 6 of
the UN Convention address the issues of equitable and reasonable
utilization. Article 7(2) requires giving due regard to the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization when significant harm has nevertheless been caused to another watercourse state. The Article also
indicates that the causing of harm may be tolerated in certain cases,
such as when the possibility of compensation may be considered.
37. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1.at 253.
38. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 6 (listing other factors, relevant to
equitable and reasonable utilization, including "'social and economic needs of watercourse States;" availability of alternatives to a planned use; and population dependent on watercourse in each State).
39. See UN Convention, supra note 11. art. 7(0).
40. See id. art. 7(2).

1488

AM. U. INTL L. REV.

[ 16:1477

This overview of Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the UN Convention indicates
that the obligation not to cause significant harm has clearly been
subordinated to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
Since those elements of the UN Convention reflect customary international law, there is no conflict between the principle of equitable
and reasonable utilization, and the obligation not to cause significant
harm.4
The endorsement of the UN Convention by the Commission is
certainly a commendable step and in line with other similar endorsements. 2 Despite the slow process of signing and ratifying the
41. See Stephen McCaffrey, The UN Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls, in
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES - ENHANCING COOPERATION AND MANAGING

CONFLICT (Salman M. A. Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, eds.)
World Bank Technical Paper No. 414, at 22 (1998) (discussing the subordination
of the obligation not to cause significant harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization) [hereinafter International Watercourses]; see also GabcikovoNagymaros, infra note 42 (adding that the International Court of Justice in the
Gabcikovo-Nagynaros case referred to the principle of reasonable and equitable
utilization, and made no reference to the obligation not cause harm).
42. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. No. 92
(Sept. 25) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1997) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagynaros]
(explaining that the Court issued its judgment in September 1997, which was four
months after the Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly); id. at para. 8 (stating that the adoption of the Convention strengthened the
principle of community of interest for non-navigational uses of international watercourses). See generally UN Convention, supra note 1I,at para. 147 (explaining
the right of watercourse states to participate in the use, development and protection
of the international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner, and the
duty of such a state to cooperate in the protection and development of such a watercourse). Moreover, the Court emphasized the importance of "the multi-purpose
program, in the form of a coordinated single unit, for the use, development and
protection of the watercourse is implemented in an equitable and reasonable manner." See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra, at para. 150; see also GLOBAL WATER
PARTNERSHIP, TOWARDS WATER SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 32
(2000) (concluding that the basis for consensus in the management of shared waters would be strengthened by the reactivation and follow-up of the currently
stalled work of the United Nations Convention on Non-Navigable (sic) Uses of
International Watercourses): Green Cross International, National Sovereignty and
InternationalWatercourses, 60 (Mar. 2000) (stating a clear endorsement of the UN
Convention by the Sovereignty Panel of the World Commission on Water for the
21" Century when it proposed "the ratification of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses."). The Sovereignty
Panel added that "This would not only contribute to the universal application of the
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Convention, it is generally agreed that the key elements of the Convention identified above reflect customary international water law
principles. 43 It is unlikely, however, that the Commission's recommendation that national water policies and legislation make a specific reference to basin agreements will gain wide acceptance.
Agreements on shared rivers are negotiated and concluded as a result
of many factors, the most important of which is the political will of
the riparian states to cooperate. The presence or absence of a reference to the basin agreements in the national legislation is unlikely to
influence such a political will.
B. ALLOCATION OF BENEFITS, NOT JUST WATER
The Commission noted that the competing demands on the waters
of some of the shared rivers often exceed the available supply, and as
such may result in disputes over allocation between the riparian
states.' Hence, the Commission recommends shifting from a primary
focus on the allocation of water, to a wider focus on sharing the
benefits derived from the use of water." The comparative advantages
of each of the riparian states, derived from differences in typography,
climate, or other resource endowment, could be used effectively to
generate synergies. For example, one riparian state may be better endowed to use the shared river for power generation, whereas another
riparian state may have better soil, climate, and infrastructure for irrigation. This optimization of the use of the shared river results in
wider benefits shared by all the riparian states.
The approach of shifting the focus to benefits, rather than just concentrating on sharing the waters of the shared river, is not new. The
United States and Canada entered into lengthy negotiations that reprinciples of equitable utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm,
but would be a gesture of good will and indicate a high level of dedication to resolving the question of international watercourses." Id.
43. See Stephen McCaffrey, supra note 41, at 26.
44. See WCD REPORT, supra note I, ch. 5 (addressing the demands placed on
waterways and the disputes that arise when waterways are shared).
45. See id. at 251 (explaining that this approach is reflected in the title of the
seventh strategic priority entitled "Sharing rivers for peace, development and security," and not sharing the waters of the rivers).
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suited in the 1961 Treaty on the issue for sharing benefits generated
by the waters of the Columbia River.46 Similarly, India and Nepal, on
February 12, 1996, concluded a treaty on the Mahakali river with a
view of setting forth the foundation for an integrated development
approach to water use between them. 47 The UN Convention itself
makes a number of references to the notion of "shared benefits," as
well as to the principle of "optimal and sustainable utilization."48 In46. The 1909 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to
the Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada established the International Joint Commission (IJC), which was entrusted with reviewing projects that
would affect the flow of boundary waters. See TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1776-1949, 319 (compiled by Charles Bevans, 1972). The IJC studied the issues of
developing hydropower and flood control facilities on the Columbia River and
made its recommendations in 1959. The study included recommendations on
sharing the net benefits between the two countries. These recommendations
formed the basis for negotiation of "The Treaty between Canada and the United
States Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin" in 1961. See Treaty on Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan.-Sept. 1964, U.S.-Can., 592 UNTS
272; see also Exchange of Notes, 3 ILM 318 (1964). See generally Charles
Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW,
SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 321 (Patricia Wouters,
Ed., 1997) (discussing the treaty between Canada and United States); Ralph W.
Johnson, The Columbia Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS 167 (Garretson et al, Eds., 1967) (providing background on Columbia
River dispute and explaining legal, political, and economic factors important to resolving issue). The Commission misstated the date of the last treaty regarding the
Columbia River Basin between the United States and Canada as 1968. The correct
date is 1961. Compare WCD REPORT, supra note 1, 175; with, Treaties in Force,
List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force
on January 1, 2000, 39-40 (Compiled by the Treaty Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State).
47. See Treaty Concerning Integrated Development of Mahakali River, Feb.
12, 1996, India-Nepal, 36 I.L.M. 531 [hereinafter Mahakali Treaty]; see also Salman M. A. Salman and Kishor Uprety, Hydro-Politics in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 295
(1999).
48. See UN Convention, supra note II, art. 5(1) (stating that "[i]n particular, an
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a
view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom."); id. art. 8 (stating that "Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to
attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse."). See generally UN Convention, supra note 11, preamble (using language
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deed, a number of initiatives on some of the shared rivers, such as
the Nile Basin Initiative, emphasize the sharing of benefits, not just
the allocation of waters. 4' As such, the Commission's Report has
highlighted this notion of the allocation of benefits, and provided a
more public forum for debate on the most optimal ways of achieving
such an allocation.
C. NOTIFICATION, REPLY, AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The Commission, in the first recommendation on shared rivers, included the requirement to notify other riparian states of the plan to
build a dam on the shared river, if such states may suffer significant
harm as a result of the building of such a dam."' The third recommendation of the Commission dealt with the procedures that a riparian state should follow and the rights and obligations of the state that
may suffer significant harm if another riparian state continues with
plans to build a dam." The recommendation states that dams on
shared rivers should not be built if one of the riparian states raises an
objection that is upheld by an independent panel.5The Commission provided detailed procedures for notification."
The first notification is to take place at the early stage of planning, as
part of the strategic impact assessment5 4 The notifying state should
allow potentially affected riparian states at least three months to
to connote the belief that benefits are to be shared beyond just that of water).
49. See Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat, The Nile Basin Initiative - Preparatory
Phase Working Documents, Report No. 01, Entebbe. June 1999. at I (explaining
that the objectives of the Nile Basin Initiative include developing the water resources of the Nile Basin "in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity,
security and peace for all its peoples," ensuring "efficient water management and
the optimal use of the resources," and ensuring "cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win gains.").
50. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1. at 253 (explaining that the first policy
principle includes prior information to other riparian states on plans that may significantly affect them).
51. See id. at 254 (outlining the necessary steps to ensure good faith negotiation among riparian states in planning to build a dam on a shared nver).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 306 (describing the procedures on prior notification for shared
rivers).
54. Id.
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identify relevant issues to be addressed at the subsequent preparatory
stage.15 The notified states should respond within those three
months.16 The second notification should take place prior to selecting
a location on a shared river, and the notifying state should supply
other affected riparian states with adequate technical information
about the proposed project and the results of any impact assessment.
The notified states should respond within six months of the notification.57 In case any of the notified states fail to respond within the
specified time, the notifying state could proceed with the planning
and construction subject to its observance of the relevant international law principles and the Commission's strategic priorities and
policy principles. 8 In case a state fails to notify another potentially
affected riparian state of the project, the latter should be able to request and receive information on the dam and to make its views
known.59 If the affected state is denied an opportunity to express its
views on the project, the Commission recommends that remedies be
sought through the International Court of Justice.6 ° If the notified
state objects to the dam, then the matter should be referred to an independent panel. 6' The dam should not be built if the panel upholds
the objection. Further, if the dispute persists, it should be referred to
the International Court of Justice.62
Although these recommendations may seem far-reaching, they are,
by and large, in line with the principles of international water law in
this area, as enunciated by the UN Convention. Indeed, Part III of the
UN Convention, which deals with "planned measures" is the longest

55. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 306.

56. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
See id. (quoting the procedure outlined in the report).
See id. ( explaining the procedures to safeguard the rights of potentially af-

fected riparian states).

61. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 254 (stating that if the parties fail to
reach an agreement after the six-month notification period, an independent panel
should be created under the UN Convention).
62. See id. (recommending the use of the International Court of Justice as a last
resort if the parties fail to resolve disputed through an independent panel).
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part of the Convention and consists of nine articles." These articles
oblige the state planning a measure that may have a significant adverse effect upon other riparian states to provide such states with
timely notification, accompanied by available technical data and related information, and to allow six months for response.' Although
63. See UN Convention, supra note 11, arts. 11-19 (dealing with planned
measures); see also UN Convention, supra note 11, arts. 30, 33 (addressing the issues of "Indirect Procedures" and "Settlement of Disputes"). In the case of Article
30, some of the riparian countries may not have a diplomatic relationship with
other riparian states, or the relationship between them may not be conducive to
discussion of such issues. Consequently, notification may have to be affected
through indirect procedures. In the case of Article 33, the matter may not be resolved through negotiations; thus, the procedures for dispute settlement may have
to be invoked.
64. See UN Convention, supra note I1,arts. 11-19 (explaining applicable procedures to encourage cooperation between riparian states when "planned measures" may adversely affect other riparian states). Notification is also addressed in
the work of the Institute of International law, particularly in what is commonly
known as Salzburg Resolution of 1961, Utilization ofVon-Maritne International
Waters (Except for Navigation), reprinted in, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (1962)
[hereinafter the Salzburg Resolution]. Under Article 5 of the Salzburg Resolution.
works or utilization that may have serious effects on the possibility of utilization of
the same waters by other states may not be undertaken except after prior notice to
the interested states. See Salzburg Resolution, supra, art. 5. Under Article 6. if an
objection is made, the states will enter into negotiations with the intention of
reaching an agreement within a reasonable time. See Salzburg Resolution, supra,
art. 6., The International Law Association has provided further commentary on the
issue of notification, through the Helsinki Rules. See INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, The Helsinki Rules art. 29(2)-(4), REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND

CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI 484, 518-19 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
The Helsinki Rules address the issue of notification in Chapter 6,"Procedures for
the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes." See the Helsinki Rules, supra, at 516.
Article 29 requires a state, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, to "furnish
to any other basin State, the interest of which may by substantially affected, notice
of any proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the
basin." See Helsinki Rules, supra, art. 29(2). at 518. The notifying state should afford the notified states a reasonable period of time to assess the probable effects of
the planed construction. See Helsinki Rules, supra, art. 29(3). at 519. If a dispute
arises, then the Helsinki Rules require the parties to seek a solution through negotiations, use of ajoint agency, mediation of a third state, commission of inquiry, or
referral to the International Court of Justice. See the Helsinki Rules, supra, art. 3034, at 522-29. The annex to the Helsinki Rules includes the "Model Rules for the
Constitution of the Conciliation Commission for the Settlement of a Dispute." See
Helsinki Rules, supra, Annex, at 531-32. See also BOURNE. supra note 46, at 249
(describing the International Law Association's contribution to International Water
Resources Law). See generally, Article 3(2) of the United Nations Declaration on
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the UN Convention provides for a one-stage notification process, it
does allow the six month period to be extended at the request of the
notified state for a period of six more months. The absence of a reply
to notification gives the notifying state the right to proceed with the
planned measure subject to its obligations under articles 5 and 7 of
the Convention. 6 The Convention also provides a watercourse state
that has reason to believe another watercourse state is planning
measures that may cause significant adverse effects, with the right to
request the other state to apply the notification provisions.6
When disputes between the notifying and notified states cannot be
resolved through consultations and negotiations, the Commission
recommended establishing an independent panel. The Commission
stated that, "[t]he creation and operation of such a panel is defined in
the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses."67 Article 33 of the UN Convention
deals with dispute settlement, and paragraph two of this Article lays
down a number of mechanisms for settlement of disputes.6x If the
parties concerned fail to resolve their dispute through negotiations or
any other means referred to in paragraph two, then the dispute shall
be submitted at the request of any disputing party to a fact-finding
commission.69 Such a fact-finding commission is to consist of three
the Right to Development adopted by the General Assembly on December 4, 1986,
which states that "[t]he realization of the right to development requires full respect
for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No.53, at 186, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128 (1987).
65. See UN Convention, supi-a note 11, art. 5 (discussing "equitable and reasonable utilization and participation"); id. art. 7 (addressing "obligations not to
cause significant harm").
66. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 18 (providing procedures in the absence of notification).
67. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 254.
68. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 33(2) (explaining that if parties
cannot reach agreement by negotiations they may (1) utilize the good offices of or
request mediation by a third party; or (2) use any joint watercourse institutions that
may have been established or (3) agree to submit their dispute to an arbitration
panel or the ICJ).
69. See id. art. 33 (3) (discussing the procedure of dispute resolution if the dispute persists after six months from the time when a party requested negotiation).
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members, one member appointed by each of the parties concerned,
and the third member, who shall be the chairman, to be selected by
the two members already nominated."' In case the two members fail
to agree on a chairman within three months of the request to establish
the fact-finding commission, any party concerned may request the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the chairman. "
One of the parties may also call upon the Secretary-General to appoint a person as the arbiter if the other party fails to nominate its
member within three months of the initial request, and the person so
appointed shall constitute a single-member commision. The factfinding commission has the right to determine its own procedure.
Further, the parties concerned are obliged to provide the fact-finding
commission with such information as it may require. which includes
providing access to their respective territory and to any facilities
relevant for the purpose of its inquiry. The fact-finding commission
shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it is a single member
commission, "and shall submit the report to the parties concerned
setting forth its findings and the reasons therefor and such recommendations as it deems appropriate for an equitable solution of the
dispute, which the parties concerned shall consider in good faith.""
In addition to the dispute resolution mechanisms described above,
the UN Convention provides for alternative methods of dispute
resolution. Any party to the Convention may submit any dispute not
resolved through the above-mentioned process to the International
Court of Justice and/or an arbitral tribunal established and operating
in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Annex to the UN
Convention. 73 The submitting party must declare in writing that it
recognizes the dispute settlement procedure "as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement in relation to any party accept-

70. See id. art. 33(4) (explaining process for establishing afact-finding committee).
71. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 33 (5) (clarifying that the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations must appoint a person who is not the nationality of
any of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian state of the watercourse concerned).
72. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art, 33 (8).
73. See UN Convention, supra note 11. art. 33 (10).
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ing the same obligation. '' 74
The Annex to the UN Convention gives detailed procedures on arbitration including composition of the tribunal, rules of procedure,
interim measures, obligations of the parties to provide all relevant
documents, information and facilities, and the cost and duration of
the tribunal. Article 14(3) of the Annex states that the award shall be
binding on the parties and shall be without an appeal unless the parties have agreed in advance to an appellate procedure.75
Thus, the Commission has opted for the fact-finding procedures
under the UN Convention since the parties are only required to consider the findings in good faith, rather than the arbitration procedures
under which the decision is binding and, generally, final. To address
the lack of a final and binding decision under the fact-finding procedure, the Commission recommends the parties refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice, if the dispute remains and the parties
do not have recourse to dispute resolution through international, re6
7
gional, or bilateral agreements.

The World Bank has adopted detailed policies and procedures for
dealing with projects on international waterways.77 Indeed, the World
74. See id. (explaining that the declaration in writing should be submitted to the
Depository for the Secretary-General of the United Nations either at the time of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the UN Convention, or any time
thereafter).
75. It should be noted that Article 14(4) of the Annex gives either party to the
dispute the right to submit to the arbitral tribunal that rendered the decision any
controversy that may arise regarding the interpretation or manner of implementation of such a decision. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 14(3).
76. See WCD REPORT, supra note I, at 254 (describing the procedure for referring the dispute to the ICJ, which would be "either by mutual agreement, or directly if both parties have previously submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ by declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court").
77. See World Bank OperationalPolicies 7.50: Projects on International Waterways, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 41, at 193-96 [hereinafter

OP 7.50]; World Bank Procedures 7.50: Projects on International Waterways, in
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note 41, at 197-200 [hereinafter BP 7.50].

See generally Raj Krishna, The Evolttion and Context of the Bank Policy for Projects on InternationalWaterways, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, supra note

41, at 31 (discussing the evolution of World Bank policy directive in this area beginning in 1956, and ultimately revised and reissued in 1994); id. (stating that
OP/BP 7.50 use the term "international waterways" rather than international rivers,
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Bank is the only international financial institution that has adopted
such policies and procedures..7 The World Bank's Operational Policy
states that it recognizes that the cooperation and goodwill of riparian
states are essential to the efficient use and protection of the waterway.79 The World Bank, therefore, attaches great importance to the
riparian states, making appropriate arrangements or agreements for
these purposes and stands ready to assist riparian states in achieving
this end.8" In the absence of agreements to this effect, the World
Bank requires the beneficiary state to notify the other riparian states
of the proposed project."' If one of the riparian states objects to the
or international watercourses because the application of the policies and procedures under OP/BP 7.50 extend beyond rivers and lakes to coastal waters).
78. See OP 7.50, supra note 77, at para. 2(a). at 193 (explaining that the policies and procedures apply to hydroelectric, irrigation, flood control, navigation,
drainage, water and sewerage, industrial, detailed design and engineering and
similar projects that involve the use or potential pollution of international waterways covered by the policy).
79. See id. at para. 3(a), at 193 (discussing agreements or arrangements for
projects on international waterways).
80. See id. hifra note 59 (explaining how the Bank used its good offices to assist India and Pakistan reach the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty); see also supre note 35
(stating that among other important initiatives on international waters the Bank is
assisting with is the Nile Basin Initiative).
81. See OP 7.50, supra note 77, para. 4 at 194 (differing from the UN Convention or the recommendations of the Commission, the Bank requires notification of
all riparians (downstream as well as upstream) of the project, regardless of whether
the project would cause significant harm or not). OP 7.50 includes three exceptions
to the notification requirement (i) projects involving additions or alterations for
any ongoing schemes that require rehabilitation, construction or other changes that
in the judgment of the World Bank will not adversely change the quality or quantity of water flows to other riparians, and will not be adversely affected by the
other riparians water use; (ii) water resources surveys and feasibility studies, and
(iii) projects in a tributary of an international waterway that runs exclusively in the
lowest downstream riparian. Id. para. 7. at 194-95. It should also be added that if
the beneficiary state indicates to the Bank that it does not wish to give notification,
then the Bank itself does so. See UN Convention, supra note 11, art. 30 (noting the
indirect procedure in the Convention is similar to the one used by the World
Bank). But see OP 7.50, supra note 77. para. 4. at 194 (stating that if the beneficiary state does not wish to give notification, and objects to the World Bank's doing
so, then the World Bank will discontinue processing the project). The notified
states are provided with sufficient project details, and given a period not exceeding
six months to reply. Past experience has shown some notified states may ask for an
extension, and the World Bank has been willing to give an extension of two to
three months, following the expiry of the original period. Id., paras. 3-4, at 198.
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project, the World Bank, in appropriate cases, may appoint one or

more independent experts to examine the issues and provide an
opinion thereon.82 Like the fact-finding commission, the independent
experts do not take part in the decision-making and their opinion is

submitted only for the World Bank's consideration. 3
Although the overall findings of the Commission with regard to
technical, financial, economic, environmental, and social perform-

ance are empirical, no such parallel can be found in its discussion on
sharing rivers for peace, development, and security. As mentioned
before, five of the in-depth case studies relate to dams built on inter-

national rivers, which are subject to several treaties. The Columbia
River, where the Grand Coulee Dam is built, is shared by the United

States and Canada and is covered by a number of treaties and exchange of Notes.84 The Zambezi River, where the Kariba Dam is
built, is shared by Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ma-

lawi, Botswana, Tanzania, and Namibia. Some of the riparian states
have entered into two treaties regarding the river. One of the treaties
specifically addresses issues related to the Kariba Dam. 5 Similarly,
82. See BP 7.50, supra note 77, paras. 8-12, at 198 (describing procedures for
the appointment of independent experts). The experts' are required to examine the
project details and if they deem it necessary to verify such details or take any related action, the World Bank will assist. The experts meet on an ad hoc basis until
they submit their report. Id. at para. 10, at 199.
83. See id. para. 11, at 199 (explaining that the experts technical opinion is
submitted to the World Bank to assist the World Bank in making its decisions in
light of the objection received, and does not in any way determine the rights and
obligations of the riparian states).
84. See Agreement Relating to the Upper Columbia River Basin, Mar. 3, 1994,
U.S.-Can., 109 U.N.T.S. 191. (codifying the treaty between the U.S. and Canada
beyond the prior treaties of 1909 and 1962, as well as the exchange of notes
thereon).
85. See Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi River System, May 28, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1109
(1998) [hereinafter Agreement on the Action Plan for Zambezi River System];
Agreement Concerning the Utilization of the Zambezi River, Zimb.-Zambia, July

8, 1987, in

TREATIES CONCERNING THE NON-NAVIGABLE USES OF INTERNATIONAL

WATERCOURSES: AFRICA, 273 (FAO Legislative Study No. 61, 1988) [hereinafter
FAO Legislative Study]. Only Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe entered into the Agreement on Action Plan for Zambezi River System,
while Angola, Malawi, and Namibia are not the parties to the agreement. See
Agreement on the Action Plan for Zambezi River System, supra, at 1109. Under
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the Indus River, where the Tarbela Dam is built, is shared by India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China, and is the subject of the Indus
Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan." The Mekong River,
where the Pak Mun Dam is built, is shared by China, Myanmar,
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand. Beginning in 1957 there
have been three successive legal instruments for the Mekong River."
China and Myanmar are not parties to these agreements. The Orange
River (also known as the Sengue River), where the Gariep and
Vanderkloof Dams are built, is shared by South Africa, Lesotho,
Namibia, and Botswana. Although there is no treaty encompassing
the four riparian states, South Africa and Lesotho signed a treaty in
1986 on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project."

the Agreement Concerning the Utilization of the Zambezi River. the Zambezi river
authority is entrusted with operating, monitoring, and maintaining the Kariba complex, which includes the dam, reservoir, telemeter stations and other related installations. See Agreement Concerning the Utilization of Zambezi River, supra, art.
9(a), at 278.
86. See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126. Negotiations were carried out under the auspices and good offices of the World Bank.
The Bank is a signatory for the purposes specified in Articles 5, (Financial Provisions) and 10 (Emergency Provisions) and Annexures F (Neutral Expert), G (Court
of Arbitration), and H (Transitional Arrangements). See generally. NIRANJ 'N D.
GULHATI, INDUS WATERS TREATY: AN EXERCISE IN INTERN,%TIONAL MEDI \TiIO\

(1973) (describing the Bank's role as a mediator between Pakistan and India in
drafting and concluding the treaty); SYED KIRMANI & GUY Li Moiu\F,
FOSTERING RIPARIAN COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL Ri\IIR BASINs: THtE
WORLD BANK AT ITS BEST IN DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMA.Y, at 3-5 (World Bank

Technical Paper, No. 335, 1997) (examining the Bank's involvement in assisting
Pakistan and India to resolve disputes in sharing the waters of the Indus River).
87. In 1957, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam. and Thailand signed the statute
creating the "Committee for the Coordination of Investigations in the Lower Mekong Basin." See GREG BROWDER & LEONARD ORTOLANO, The Evolttion 01 an
International Water Resolutions Managenent Regiine in the Mekong River Basn,
40 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 499, 505. This was followed in 1978 by the 'Declaration
Concerning the Interim Mekong Committee for Coordination of Investigations of
the Lower Mekong Basin." See BROWDER & ORTOLANO, sura, at 509, n.85. In
1995, the four countries concluded the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development for the Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5,1995, 34 I.L.M. 864.
See also BROWDER & ORTOLANO, supra, at 518 (describing the new agreement as
a new constitutional framework for the Mekong water management).
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The Commission's Report does not include any analysis of those
treaties,89 nor does it explain whether any of these treaties provide for
any form of notification.9" The Commission's Report fails to discuss
whether any of the states that built any of the dams covered by the
in-depth studies, or by the cross check survey has actually notified
any of the other riparian states. Thus, the Commission's Report did
not discuss the performance of the riparian countries that built those
dams, nor did it examine whether they have complied with the basic
rules of international water law. Addressing this issue would have
given some indication of the extent to which construction of those
dams has complied with the basic principles and recommendations
set forth in the seven strategic priorities on shared rivers." This is
88. See Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Lesotho-S. Afr., Oct. 24,
1986 in FAO Legislative Study, supra note 85, at 172 (dealing with the development and resource management in the Orange River).
89. The only reference to a treaty with regard to the eight case studies is the general mention of 1968 treaty on the Columbia River between the United States and
Canada. See the WCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 175; see also supra note 46 (noting WCD Report misstated date of treaty as 1968 when it was actually 1961).
90. See The Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 88, art. VII(2) (detailing commitments to notify parties to the Treaty in case of any future plans for construction
that would cause "inference").
91. In this connection, the WCD Report would have definitely benefited from a
general discussion of the Gabicikovo-Nagymaros case and the role of the International Court of Justice in that dispute. See supra note 42. The GabcikovoNagymaros case arose out of a dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia over
whether or not to build two barrages over the Danube river, as envisaged under a
treaty concluded between the two countries on September 16, 1997. Construction
began in the late 1970s, but in the mid 1980s, environmental groups in Hungary,
claiming negative environmental impacts of the barrages began agitating against
the project. They forced the Hungarian government to suspend works on the project in 1989. Czechoslovakia insisted that there were no negative environmental
impacts and decided to proceed unilaterally with a provisional solution consisting
of a single barrage on its side. The project required diversion of a considerable
amount of the waters of the Danube to its territory. Czechoslovakia claimed that
this was justified under the 1977 treaty. As result of the unilateral action of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary decided to terminate the 1977 treaty. In 1992, the situation was further complicated when Czechoslovakia split into two countries. As a
result of the split it was agreed that Slovakia would succeed in owning the Czechoslovakia part of the project. By that time, Czechoslovakia had already dammed the
Danube and diverted large amounts of its water into its territory. In April 1993, as
a result of pressure from the Commission of the European Communities, the two
countries agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The Court
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unlike the analysis for the financial, economic, environmental, and
social performance where the Commission entered judgments indicating an overall non-compliance with the basic standards in those
areas. As such, the Commission's recommendations, regarding the
international water law standards for dams on shared rivers, do not
stem from any empirical data or any analysis of the five case studies.
Rather, the Commission has only set out policy principles and recommendations for future dam projects.
D. SHARED RIVERS BETWEEN POLITICAL UNITS WITHIN
COUNTRIES

The fourth recommendation of the Commission relates to rivers
shared between political units within one country. The Commission
emphasized that the seven strategic priorities are relevant regardless
of whether the river is an international one, a national one shared
between political units within a country, or a river within one province. In countries where water issues are controlled at the national
level, the Commission recommended that the principles on shared
rivers be embodied in national water legislation and that an appropriate policy framework be developed for the local level.'- In countries
where sub-national political units have authority over water issues,
the federal authority "should explore mechanisms to encourage good
practice and provide incentives for compliance with the strategic priorities." 93 Licenses and environmental clearance, as well as federal
funding, could be used for ensuring that environmental and social
provisions are satisfied.
ruled in September 1997 that Hungary was not entitled to suspend or terminate the
work on the project in 1989 on environmental grounds, and that Czechoslovakia
and later Slovakia were also not entitled to operate the project based on the unilateral solution it developed without an agreement with Hungary. See id. at 46, 54,
82. The Court further ruled that Hungary was not entitled to terminate the 1977
treaty on the grounds of ecological necessity, and thus held that the treaty wvas still
in force. See id. at 62, 82. The Court concluded. "Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate in good faith in the light of the prevailing situation, and must take all necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of 16 September 1977, in accordance with such modalities as they may agree upon." Id. at

83.
92. See WCD REPORT, supra note 1. at 255.
93. See id. at 255.
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It is surprising that the Commission has given this issue such
prominence since there are few countries where jurisdictional questions over water resources have raised issues between the federal
authority and the political units within that country. The few examples include the United States, Australia, India, and Brazil, where the
respective roles and responsibilities of the central and state governments are fairly defined.
E. BUILDING DAMS IN CONTRAVENTION OF GOOD FAITH
NEGOTIATIONS

The fifth and last recommendation of the Commission addresses
situations where dams on shared rivers are built in contravention of
good faith negotiations between riparian states, including refusal to
establish a panel, or rejecting its findings when it has been established and has issued its findings. In such cases, the Commission
recommends that external financing agencies, whether bilateral,
multilateral, or export credit agencies, withdraw their support for
94
projects and programs promoted by that agency.
The Commission emphasizes that the decision to build a dam is
often considered a sovereign decision.95 However, the Commission
also underscores both the need for the international community to
take a strong and consistent stance, and the importance of compliance with the policies and guidelines of the financing agency in cases
of shared rivers. The Commission also highlights the importance of
the financing agencies harmonizing their policies towards shared rivers.9 6 The Commission based its recommendation on the theory of
fungibility of funds. This means that although the external agency
may not be financing the dam built in contravention of good faith
negotiations, its financial support for other projects in the same sector frees the agency's resources for other projects and programs related to the dam.97 Another argument advanced in support of this recommendation is that by supporting other projects and programs, the
94. See id. (explaining that external support is important and the threat of losing it
may be an incentive to engage in good faith negotiations with other riparian states).
95. See id. at 255.
96. See id. at 256.
97. Id.
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external financing agencies are helping the development of the area
around the controversial dam. This developed land will attract
movement of people to that area, which, in turn, increases the consumptive and non-consumptive use of the waters of the shared river.
This could result in less water reaching lower riparian states, thus exacerbating the adverse impact of the dam on those states.
This is the most far-reaching of all the Commission's recommendations in connection with shared rivers." Most of the other recommendations are based on an elaboration of customary international
water law, the UN Convention, or the World Bank Policy for Projects on International Waterways. However, this recommendation is a
major innovative contribution to the field, and is based on the overall
spirit enshrined in the principles of cooperation, good faith negotiations, and collaborative arrangements. The recommendation is likely
to put pressure on some countries and their dam agencies, as well as
the external financing agencies, to pay more attention to the established rules of good faith negotiations with other riparian countries.
Indeed, this recommendation will certainly enliven and enrich the
debate in this area.

CONCLUSION
As the OED Precis correctly noted, for the first half of the twentieth century, dams were regarded as engineering structures, and the
emphasis was primarily on the generation of hydro-power, controlling floods, and improving management of water." It was only in the
1960s that options assessment was introduced, and economic and financial analysis of dams became one of several major criteria for ac98. See id. ch. 8 (expanding on some of the other far-reaching recommendations
of the Commission addressing other strategic priorities including ti)
gaining public
acceptance which could be viewed as more than consultation vith the affected
communities, (ii) the negotiated decision-making process. which could be vieved
as curtailing the principle of eminent domain, and (ii) the free. pnor and informed
consent of indigenous peoples, which could be seen as giving them a veto power
over the project. Some of the developing countries that rely on international financial institutions and export credit agencies for funding their development projects
are likely to view these recommendations as raising the standards tremendously to
their disadvantage, and making it more difficult for them to build dams).
99. See OEC Precis No. 125, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining shifts of emphasis in
assessment of proposed dam projects).
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cepting or rejecting a dam. 00 Thus, economics and finance gradually
replaced engineering as the leading factor for consideration prior to
building dams. Environmental and social considerations started to
gradually emerge as major concerns in the 1970s. The voices of the
environmentalists and affected people were widely heard and became
a leading factor in the decision-making process regarding dams in the
1980s.
The adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses on May 2 1,
1997 brought international water law a long way. Although the UN
Convention has not yet entered into force, a large majority of countries in the United Nations General Assembly have voted for it. ""
Further, the UN Convention has received a number of endorsements.
The reference to the Convention by the International Court of Justice
in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision and the urging by the World
Commission for Water in the 21 st Century and its prestigious Sovereignty Panel to the states to sign and ratify the UN Convention are
two examples of endorsements received. The Commission has continued this trend and provided another major endorsement of the UN
Convention and the basic principles enunciated by the Convention.
Moreover, it has placed the principles of international water law on
equal footing with the technical, economic, financial, environmental,
and social concerns by including sharing rivers as one of its seven
strategic priorities. Thus, international water lawyers now have a
place, together with the engineers, economists, financial analysts,
environmentalists, and affected people, including indigenous peoples, in the decision-making process on dams over shared rivers. Inclusion of international water law, together with the other disciplines,
particularly environmentalists and affected people, is perhaps what
the Commission has called "new voices, perspectives and criteria
into decision-making."'

01 2

This article has also attempted to highlight some of the weaknesses in the Commission's treatment of shared river issues. The
100. See id.
101. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the
Convention in details).
102. See supra note 13.
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Commission failed to investigate whether and to what extent the
principles of international water law have been followed in the indepth case studies or the dams that were cross-check surveyed where
such dams were built on shared rivers. Further, the Commission echoed the misunderstanding that there is a conflict between the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization and the obligation not to
cause harm. As demonstrated earlier in this article, upon careful examination of international waterlaw principles, there is no conflict
between these two principles.
Nonetheless, the Commission has strengthened and emboldened
the basic requirements of cooperation and good faith negotiations
over shared rivers. The Commission has also broadened the discussion over the optimal utilization of such rivers, from the narrow angle of sharing their waters to the wider approach of sharing the benefits derived therefrom. Further, the Commission's recommendation
that external financing agencies withdraw support from the projects
and programs of any agency that builds a dam in contravention of
good faith negotiations is a positive contribution to the dams debate.
These recommendations, as well as the endorsement and elaboration
of the basic principles of the UN Convention, will no doubt enliven
the debate on these vital issues. That, by itself, is a major contribution by the Commission to the field of international water law.

